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Abstract In the development process of a secure system
is essential to detect as early as possible the system’s
vulnerable points, the so called attack surfaces, and to
estimate how feasible it would be that known attacks
breach through them. Even if attack surfaces can be
sometimes detected automatically, mapping them against
known attacks still is a step apart. Systems and attacks are
not usually modelled in compatible formalisms. We de-
velop a practical framework that automates the whole
process. We formalize a system as SysML activity dia-
grams and in the same formalism we model libraries of
patterns taken from standard catalogues of social engi-
neering and technical attacks. An algorithm that we define,
navigates the system’s diagrams in search for its attack
surfaces; then it evaluates the possibility and the prob-
ability that the detected weak points host attacks among
those in the modelled library. We prove the correctness and
the completeness of our approach and we show how it
works on a use case scenario. It represents a very common
situation in the domain of communication and data security
for corporations.
Keywords Systems attacks  Attack patterns  Attack
surfaces  SysML activity diagrams  Socio-technical
security
1 Introduction
There are two distinct yet related challenges in the devel-
opment of secure software and systems. One is about dis-
covering vulnerabilities at as early as possible stages of the
system development’s life-cycle; the other is about
assessing and possibly quantifying the degree of vul-
nerability of an existing system when this is exposed to
known attacks.
A response to the first challenge requires to check
whether a model of the system satisfies a set of relevant
security properties. This check is performed in the presence
of an attacker, usually a Dolev Yao adversary (Dolev and
Yao 1983) that controls all the system’s communication
channels to interfere with the system’s functionalities. This
technique of analysis is known as model checking (Clarke
et al. 1983). It has been successfully applied to discover
insidious attacks and anomalies for the risk analysis and
security assessment of the model-based systems (Solhaug
and Seehusen 2014). However, although efficiently im-
plemented in specific cases (Clarke et al. 2012), model
checking’s worst-case time complexity is exponential in
the size of the system’s and of the property’s models. Large
systems may be beyond reach for this type of analysis. The
response to the second challenge, instead, is more prag-
matic. Considering only documented attacks—that is, pat-
terns of actions known to be used to compromise the
system’s integrity, availability, and confidentiality (Abrams
1998)—it consists in estimating the system’s degree of
vulnerability looking at the system’s attack surfaces
(Manadhata and Wing 2011). An attack surface is roughly
the set of system’s actions that are accessible externally
and the system’s resources which can be modified via those
actions. The more extensive the attack surface is, the more
vulnerable the system can be.
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This paper’s work is about this second challenge. It
proposes a formal framework to detect attack surfaces
automatically on systems modelled in SysML (OMG
2007a). SysML is a UML2.0-based formalism and a
prominent object-oriented graphical language which has
become de facto a standard in software and systems
modelling. Assuming that a system is modelled in SysML
is therefore a pragmatic choice, in order to be compliant
with the current engineering practices. SysML reuses a
subset of UML packages (OMG 2007b), namely the sub-
set already extensively used in modelling large and com-
plex systems, and it extends it with other features of
quantitative nature, such as probability. These diagrams
can call and communicate with other diagrams and allow
for probabilistic behaviour specification. Particularly,
SysML’s activity diagrams, the specific formalism that this
work adopts, can express a qualitative and quantitative
elements of a system’s behaviour and at various levels of
abstraction (Holt and Perry 2008).
Detecting attack surfaces requires to inspect a system’s
model and to find out if known attacks can reach the sys-
tem’s core procedures via the system’s exposed actions.
The literature offers a variety of ways to describe attacks:
attack tree (Mauw and Oostdijk 2005), attack graph
(Sawilla and Ottawa 2007), and network attack graph
(Sheyner 2004), to cite a few. Such models are used by
many organizations that have a special interest in collect-
ing, describing, and classifying attack patterns. For in-
stance, large taxonomies of comprehensive samples of
existing attacks have been built by security organizations,
such as the common attack pattern enumeration and clas-
sification (CAPEC)1, a sponsored by the National Cyber
Security Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, and the web application security consortium
(WASC)2. But existing techniques to model attacks are not
compatible with the techniques commonly used to model
systems. These last are not meant to be used to highlight
easily a system’s attack surfaces. Systems, on their side, are
not modelled to be interfaced with attack trees/graphs/
networks. There is so a gap between the way attacks and
the way systems are modelled. Detecting attack surfaces
against attack models is therefore not a process that can be
done fully automatically.
This paper proposes a solution to this problem. We
model both systems and attack patterns directly in SysML,
and we design an algorithm that, by traversing a system
model, collects all the system’s attack surfaces and links
them to the given library of attack patterns. We consider, as
a proof of concept, standard attacks among those proposed
by CAPEC, and we show how to model both technical
attacks and social engineering attacks in SysML: the result
is a rich library of socio-technical attack templates in such
a formalism. The library can be of course extended.
This paper is based on a previous conference paper that
the authors have published (Ouchani and Lenzini 2014).
However, it extends considerably that work: it models so-
cial engineering attacks, not studied in Ouchani and Len-
zini (2014), it improves the algorithm for searching attack
surfaces, and proves the algorithm’s correctness and com-
pleteness with respect to the library of attacks in input. The
whole presentation has also been restyled and improved.
Finally, the current paper applies the framework to a new
use case, more complex than the one presented in Ouchani
and Lenzini (2014) and more interesting from a socio-
technical perspective. It is, in fact, a typical scenario in the
domain of data and communication security for ICT-based
corporations.
Outline The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 reviews the existing related work. Sec-
tion 3 describes and formalizes SysML activity diagrams;
and Sect. 4 presents the concept of attack patterns. The
attack generation framework is detailed in Sect. 5. The
experimental results are described in Sect. 6. Finally,
Sect. 7 concludes this paper and provides the future works.
2 Related work
In this section, we survey the existing initiatives related to
system attacks modelling and to attack surfaces detection.
2.1 Attack modelling
A risk-based approach has been proposed to create modular
attack trees for each component in the system (Grunske and
Joyce 2008). These trees are specified as parametric con-
straints, which allow quantifying the probability of security
breaches that occur due to internal and external component
vulnerabilities. Another approach models probability met-
rics based on attack graphs as a special Bayesian network
(Frigault and Wang 2008). Each node of the network rep-
resents vulnerabilities as well as the pre and post condi-
tions. Ju¨rjens and Shabalin (2004) and Houmb et al. (2010)
extract specific cryptography-related information from
UMLsec diagrams. Moreover, the Dolev–Yao model of an
attacker is included with UMLsec to model the interaction
with the environment. Further, Siveroni et al. (2010) ex-
tend UMLsec to model peer-to-peer applications along
with their security aspects. They rely on the concept of
abuse cases defined as UML use cases and state machine
diagrams to represent attack scenarios. Morais et al. (2013)
generate attack scenarios from the threat model of the
wireless security protocol. First, they collect attacks from
1 http://capec.mitre.org.
2 http://www.webappsec.org.
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vulnerabilities databases. Then, they classify them in terms
of violated properties. Finally, they generate the protocol
attack tree by relying to SecurelTree tool.
2.2 Attack surfaces detection
Gegick and Williams (2007) identify security vul-
nerabilities in code level by tailoring attack patterns based
on the software components. These patterns take the form of
regular expressions that are generic representations of vul-
nerabilities. Huang et al. (2011) distil attack surfaces of an
attack graph by shifting out the minimum cost in the graph.
They use SAT solver to view the minimum effort of an
attack to conquer critical assets in the system. Vijayakumar
et al. (2012) develop an approach based on runtime analysis
to compute attack surfaces by finding the system adversaries
in order to determine which program entry points access is
an adversary controlled objects. They use the system’s ac-
cess control policy to distinguish adversary controlled data
from trusted ones. Kantola et al. (2012) identify the com-
munication attack surfaces by considering intent-based at-
tacks on applications that do not hold common signature-
level permissions. Any component of the correct type with a
matching intent filter can intercept the intent. The possible
attacks enabled by such unauthorized intent receipt depend
on the type of the intent. Checkoway et al. (2011) analyse
the external attack surface of modern automobile systems.
Systematically, they synthesize the set of possible external
attack vectors as a function of the attackers ability to deliver
malicious input via specific modalities. For each modality,
they characterize the attack surface exposed in current au-
tomobiles with their set of channels.
3 SysML activity diagrams
SysML (OMG 2007a) is a general-purpose, graphical,
modelling language for specifying, designing, and verify-
ing complex hardware and software systems, as well as
organizative and procedural workflows. The language
provides a semantic foundation for modelling a system
structure and behaviour.
SysML activity diagrams are SysML’s elements that
focus on a system’s behaviour. Activity diagrams are
graphs: their vertices stand for activities (called activity
nodes) and their edges stand for connections among ac-
tivities (called activity edges) that define objects/data flow
or control flows. In particular, an activity node can be of
the following types:
• An activity invocation element: it sends or receives
signals or objects, or it calls an operation or calls a
behaviour.
• A control flow element: it defines the initial and the final
flow of the diagram, or the final flow of a path, or a
decision nodes. It can be a fork, a merge or a join node.
An activity edge can be of the following types:
• A control flow element: it shows the execution path
through the activity diagram. Incoming edges are called
input edges; outcoming edges are called output edges.
• An object flow element: it shows the object flow
between activity nodes. Incoming edges are called
input tokens; outcoming edges are called output tokens.
Branching is modelled with decision nodes and merge
nodes. A decision node specifies a choice between different
possible paths. The direction to take depends on the eval-
uation of a boolean guard, if the decision is boolean. It
depends instead on a probability distribution, if the deci-
sion is probabilistic. A merge node specifies a point from
where different incoming control paths start following the
same path.
Concurrency and synchronization are modelled with
fork nodes and join nodes. A fork node indicates the be-
ginning of multiple parallel control threads. In UML2.0, on
which SysML is based, fork nodes model unrestricted
parallelism: thus, a token evolves asynchronously accord-
ing to an interleaving semantics. A join node allows mul-
tiple parallel control threads to synchronize and rejoin.
Table 1 resumes the graphical artifacts of SysML ac-
tivity diagrams (left column) and the corresponding formal
expressions used to express the proposed framework
(middle column) all followed by an informal description of
the artifact (right column).
When a SysML activity diagram is invoked, its initial
node activates. It is custom to assume that the initial node
activates by possessing a token. A node activates, and thus
it takes the token, only if the preceding node de-activates
and if the condition guarding the node’s incoming edge is
satisfied. During execution, the action or the decision node
that has an associated call behaviour can consume its input
token and invoke its specified behaviour. SysML supports
two types of invocations: synchronous and asynchronous.
In the asynchronous invocation, the execution of the in-
voked behaviour proceeds without any further dependency
on the execution of the activity that invokes it. In the
synchronous invocation, the execution of the calling arti-
fact is blocked until it receives a reply token from the
invoked behaviour. In a decision node that has more than
one path enabled, the choice of which behaviour to activate
is done non-deterministically.
Definition 1 gives the formal definition of SysML ac-
tivity diagrams. Properties 1 and 2 express how the struc-
ture and the control flow are constrained in a SysML
activity diagram.
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Definition 1 (SysML Activity Diagram) A SysML ac-
tivity diagram is a tuple A ¼ ð; fin;N;E;K;Prob; TokÞ,
where:
1.  is the initial node,
2. fin ¼ f;g is the set of final nodes,
3. N ¼N1 [N2 [N3 is a finite set of activity nodes,
whereN1,N2, andN3 are activity invocation, object
and control nodes, respectively.
4. E is a finite set of activity edges,
5. K is a finite set of tokens,
6. Prob : ðfg [NÞ  E! Dist ðN [ finÞ is a
probabilistic transition function that assigns for each
node a discrete probability distribution
l 2 DistðN [ finÞ,
7. Tok : N [ E!K is a function that assigns for each
node or edge one token.
Property 1 (Structure Constraint) For a SysML activity
diagram A, let jEj be the number of edges, and jNj ¼
jN1j þ jN2j þ jN3j is the number of nodes. We have:
1. If N3 ¼ ;; then : jNj ¼ jEj  1
2. If N3 6¼ ;; then : jNj\jEj  1
Property 2 (Token Constraint) In a SysML activity dia-
gram A, let jEj represents the number of edges, and jKj is
the number of tokens. Then: jKj\jEj þ jNj.
4 Modelling attack patterns
The standard schema for describing attack patterns we refer
to is that devised by the software assurance strategic ini-
tiative CAPEC, the already mentioned common attack
patterns enumeration and classification. The schema con-
sists of primary and supporting elements. The primary
schema elements provides the following information: an
attack pattern ID, the description of the attack, its related
weaknesses, its typical severity, likelihood of exploitation,
and the attack’s abstraction level. The supporting schema
elements gives the description, the diagnosis, and other
enhancing information about the attack.
Inspired by these schemata we propose a SysML activity
diagram attack pattern template (see Fig. 1). Each concrete
attack pattern will be built by instantiating this template.
The instantiation specifies the call behaviour action that is
denoted by ‘‘Pattern Behaviour’’ in Fig. 1. The template’s
main control flow is a probabilistic decision. The prob-
ability that the attack does occur is P, whereas 1-P is the
probability that the attack does not occur.
The value P is estimated on the basis of the ‘‘typical
likelihood of exploitation’’ schema element provided
within CAPEC catalogue. However, this schema element is
a qualitative description of the likelihood (called CAPEC
term), that ranges from ‘‘low’’ to ‘‘high’’ (see Table 2). In
order to quantify these attributes, we propose to assign
Table 1 Formalization of
SysML Activity Diagram
Artifacts
Artifacts Formalization Description
iN Initial node. It is activated when a diagram is invoked
 Activity final node. It stops the diagram’ execution
  Flow final node kills its related path’ execution.
aN Action node defines an atomic action
a "AN Call behaviour node invokes a new behaviour
a!vN Send node is used to send a signal/object
a?vN Receive node is used to receive a signal/object
DðA; p; g;N;NÞ Decision node with a call behaviour A a convex distribution
fp; 1  pg and guarded edges fg;:gg
MðxÞN Merge node specifies the continuation where x ¼ fx1; x2g is a
set of input pins
FðN1;N2Þ Fork node models the concurrency that begins multiple
parallel control threads. UML 2.0 activity forks model
unrestricted parallelism
JðxÞN Join node presents the synchronization where x ¼ fx1; x2g is a
set of input pins
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ranges of probabilities to each qualitative description based
on the standard of security risk management (ISO 2008) in
combination with the Kent‘s Words of Estimative Prob-
ability (Sherman and the Board of National Estimates
2008), which proposes seven grades of likelihood. We
combine the two schemes, and we propose the probabilities
ranges as in Table 2.
The probability related to the instantiated pattern is
obtained by the average of the probability interval assigned
to a CAPEC term.
4.1 Instantiating the attack pattern: technical
attacks
There are two categories of attacks that we considered
relevant: software attacks (CAPEC-513), and communica-
tions attacks (CAPEC-512). The former is composed of
twenty five attacks, among which the brute force (CAPEC-
112), authentication abuse (CAPEC-114). We do not list
the all attacks, for sake of space, but they can be found in
the CAPEC taxonomy. The latter includes two attacks:
interception (CAPEC-117) and protocol manipulation
(CAPEC-272). In the following, we model a selected set of
these technical attacks.
• Spoofing (CAPEC-156): an attacker builds a message
to masquerade an authorized message from a trusted
principal. Consumers of these messages can be ma-
nipulated into responding or processing the deceptive
message. This attack may refer to spoofing the
message’s content (CAPEC-148) or to spoofing the
message’s senders or receivers (CAPEC-151). Their
pattern is depicted by the following figure such that P
(CAPEC-148) ¼ P (CAPEC-151) ¼ 0.8. We have
assigned the value of 0.8 since their severity is high.
This means that the average of 60 and 100 %.
• Data leakage (CAPEC-118): the attacker uses well-
formed requests to get sensitive information by ex-
ploiting weaknesses in the design. Three techniques are
used in this class: data excavation (CAPEC-116), data
interception (CAPEC-117), and sniffing (CAPEC-148).
CAPEC-116 and CAPEC-117 are presented by the first
control flow with P (CAPEC-116) ¼ 0.5 and ¼P
(CAPEC-117) ¼ 0.5. Also, CAPEC-148 is illustrated in
the second control flow with a probability value P
(CAPEC-148) ¼ 0.2.
• Resource depletion (CAPEC-119): the attacker depletes
a resource to the point that the target’s functionality is
affected. The result is usually the degradation or denial
of one or more services offered by the target. The
attacker can achieve his objective through flooding
(CAPEC-125), through leak (CAPEC-131) by upload-
ing a malicious file, or through allocation (CAPEC-
131) by sending a formatted request. The pattern of
these attacks is depicted by the following diagram
where n is the number of requests and m is a number
fixed by the designer. These attacks are launched by
these probability values: P(CAPEC-125) ¼ 0.8,
P(CAPEC-131) ¼ 0.8.
• Injection (CAPEC-152): The attacker is able to control
or disrupt the behaviour of a target through crafted
input data submitted using an interface functioning to
process data input. Different resource-dependent pat-
terns are detailed in CAPEC and abstracted to design
level such as SQL (CAPEC-66), email (CAPEC-134),
format string (CAPEC-135), LDAP (CAPEC-136),
resource injection (CAPEC-240), script injection
(CAPEC-242), and command injection (CAPEC-248).
Fig. 1 The SysML activity diagram of the attack pattern template
Table 2 Probability values scale
CAPEC terms Kent’s estimative terms Probability values
High Certain 100
Almost certain 93 % (6 %)
Medium to high Probable 75 % (12 %)
Medium Chances about even 50 % (10 %)
Low to medium Probably not 30 % (10 %)
Low Almost certainly not 7 % (5 %)
Impossible 0
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All of them take the form of the following control flow
with a probability of 0.8.
• Exploitation of authentication (CAPEC-225): the at-
tacker exploits the weaknesses related to authentication
mechanisms including authentication bypass by spoof-
ing (CWE-290), authentication bypass by assumed
immutable data (CWE-302), and origin validation error
(CWE-346). Particularly, its descendant sub-category
CAPEC-21 aims at exploiting session variables, resource
IDs and other trusted credentials to exploit that some
software accepts user input without verifying its authen-
ticity. They have the following work flow with P ¼ 0.8.
• Fuzzing (CAPEC-28): of the probabilistic techniques
(CAPEC-223) and it is inspired by a software testing
method. The attacker provides randomly generated
input to the system and looks for an indication to
identify weaknesses in the system. The pattern of this
attack is depicted by the following control flow such
that P(CAPEC-28) ¼ 0.8 and P1, P2; . . ., Pn are
probability values (e.g. uniformly distributed).
4.2 Instantiating the attack pattern: social engineering
attacks
In this category fall attacks that use social engineering
techniques. Social engineering attacks target people and
persuade them to perform actions, usually divulging con-
fidential information that should not be shared. In this way
social engineering can gain access to a computer system
and its resources without hacking the system.
The CAPEC taxonomy has recently included social
engineering attacks too. From it we propose the classifi-
cation shown in Fig. 2. It consists of three categories of
attacks: social information gathering (CAPEC-404), in-
formation elicitation (CAPEC-410), and target influence
via social engineering (CAPEC-416). Each category has a
set of attacks and sub-class of attacks.
We select one of such attacks and we show how to
model it in SysML: spear phishing (CAPEC-163), which
uses phishing (CAPEC-98).
Spear phishing is a very common social engineering
attack. In fact, recent statistics show that 91 % of attacks
are phishing Corporation (2014), and about 95 % of cyber
espionage attacks started with a phishing email. By mod-
elling it therefore we have maximum relevance and de-
ceptive capability.
In spear phishing, the intruder starts by obtaining useful
information about the targeted user or organization. First,
the intruder conducts a web searching and identifies trusted
associates of target, pretexts the users, and collects social
information via dumpster diving, and traditional and non-
traditional sources. Then, the intruder creates a domain
name that looks similar to the legitimate one and a le-
gitimate SSL certificate for the new domain name. After,
the attacker develops a duplicate of the legitimate website,
for example, by use spidering software. The website may
include very specific user information such as local tem-
perature. Then, the intruder sends to the user a message
from a spoofed legitimate-looking e-mail address or post a
phishing link in an online forum that asks the user to click
on the included link. After that, the intruder convinces the
user to enter sensitive information on attacker’s site. Fi-
nally, the intruder uses the stolen credentials to log into
legitimate site.
Based on spear phishing description, the pattern of this
attack is depicted by the diagrams depicted in Fig. 3. The
first diagram has three call behaviour actions where each
one calls the appropriate diagram with respect to the dia-
grams order. Since in CAPEC, the typical severity and the
likelihood of this attack are evaluated high, then, the
probability value to launch this attack is: P(CAPEC-163) ¼
0.8.
5 Attacks generation framework
In this section, we detail our proposed framework that
automatically finds attacks that match a given system. The
schema of the framework is depicted in Fig. 4. It takes as
input a system modelled by a set of SysML activity dia-
grams that can be designed either by relying on the system
specification document, or by reverse-engineering the
system source code. To generate attacks specific to the
system under test, the framework uses the library of attack
templates that is proposed in Sect. 4. Then, the framework
proposes an algorithm to detect attack surfaces from where
an attack can damage the system. Further, the algorithm
assigns for each detected attack surface a set of potential
attacks. Based on them, the framework produces the pos-
sible application-dependent attacks that are instantiated
from the attack library. As a result, a set of concrete attacks
proper to the system under test is produced.
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5.1 Attack surfaces detection
A system’s attack surface relates with a system’s exposed
vulnerabilities, and then with an adversary’s ability to in-
terfere with the system and to damage it. The larger the attack
surface, the greater the vulnerability, the more potential at-
tacks the system may suffer. An attack surface is described as
a subset of a system’s resources, usually the system’s data,
variables, and actions, that an intruder can control and, in so
doing, to interfere with the system’s behaviour.
A key notion is that of untrusted objects.
Definition 2 (Untrusted object) An object v is untrusted
if it is acquired by an input action or if it depends on an
untrusted object. Object v depends on another object w, if v
is calculated from w.
Social En-
gineering
(CAPEC-403)
Social Information
Gathering
(CAPEC-404)
Information
Elicitation
(CAPEC-410)
Target Influence
(CAPEC-416)
via Research
(CAPEC-405)
via Dump-
ster Diving
(CAPEC-406)
via Pretexting
(CAPEC-407)
from Tradi-
tional Sources
(CAPEC-408)
from Non-
Traditional
Sources
(CAPEC-409)
Gathering via
Pretexting
(CAPEC-407)
Perception of
Reciprocation
(CAPEC-417)
Perception
of Scarcity
(CAPEC-420)
Perception
of Authority
(CAPEC-421)
Perception of
Commitment
and Consis-
tency (CAPEC-
422)
Perception
of Liking
(CAPEC-423)
Perception of
Consensus or
Social Proof
(CAPEC-424)
Manipulation
of Incentives
(CAPEC-425)
Manipulation
of Incentives
(CAPEC-426)
Psychological
Principles
(CAPEC-427)
Fig. 2 CAPEC taxonomy of
social engineering attacks
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Definition 3 formalizes the notion of attack surface in
SysML terms.
Definition 3 (Attack surface) Let A be SysML model.
An attack surface is a tuple x ¼ hN;X;O;Chi, where:
1. N is the set of entry points ofA, all the artifacts except
send artifacts.
2. X is the set of exit points of A, the send artifacts.
3. O is the set of untrusted objects of A.
4. Ch : N [ X ! 2O maps entry or exit points to untrust-
ed objects.
To determine the attack surfaces of a SysML activity
diagram A, we parse, depth-first manner, the diagram.
Procedure N, illustrated in Algorithm 1, does this search,
and construct the attack surface X ¼ ðx1;x2;x3;x4Þ. Here
x1, x2, x3, and x4 are the entry points, the exit points, the
untrusted data, and the channels, respectively.
Herein is the description of Algorithm 1. First, the initial
node i of A is pushed into the stack of nodes, denoted by
nodes (line 11). While the stack nodes is not empty (line
12–39), the algorithm pops a node from the stack nodes,
denoted by cNode (line 13). If cNode has a call behaviour
(line 15), the called diagram is pushed in the stack Beh
(line 16). Then, the current node is added into the list
vNode of visited nodes (line 18), but only if it has not been
visited already (line 14). Its successors are stored in the list
nNode (line 19). The algorithm constructs the attack sur-
faces X (line 21, 24, 27, and 30) by checking the type of
cNode (lines 20, 23, 26, and 30, respectively). Notably,
objects that are inputted are inserted in the list of untrusted
objects directly. Each artifact that contains an untrusted
object or an objects that depends on any untrusted objects
is added to the attack surface and linked to the untrusted
object that determines its vulnerability. The artifact’s re-
lated object(s), in turn, are added to the list of untrusted
objects. The explored successors are pushed into the stack
nodes (line 33–35), then, they are erased from the list
nNode (line 36). The algorithm calls recursively itself (line
39) since there is a behavioural diagram in Beh (lines 38–
40). Finally, the algorithm calls the function K (line 41)
that assigns for each attack surface a set of attacks (detailed
in the next section). Then, it terminates since all nodes of
all diagrams are visited (lines 12 and 38).
5.2 Application-dependent attacks generation
Our objective is to assign the appropriate attack template for
each attack surface that is detected by Algorithm 1. Then,
we instate this template to be dependent to the system under
study. For that, we propose the function K that is described
in Listing 1 which assigns for each attack surface x 2 X at
least one attack k 2 K. The set of attacks K ¼ fk1; k2;
k3; . . .; k11g where the CAPEC id of a ki is given by Table 3.
For example, k1 is CAPEC-148 and k11 is CAPEC-163.
Fig. 3 Spear phishing template
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5.3 Correctness and complexity
Procedure N search exhaustively all attack surfaces.
Function K assigns to each detected attack surface the
appropriate attacks from the library. Our algorithm is
correct, in the sense that it points out all the model’s attacks
surfaces and assigns to each of them all the appropriate
attacks among the ones in the attack library. Proposition 1
proves such statements.
Proposition 1 (Correctness and completeness)
(a) Algorithm N is correct and complete, i.e. it detects
all and only the A’s artifacts that process or depend
on untrusted objects.
(b) Algorithm K is correct and complete, i.e. it assigns
to each node all and only the attacks that are
applicable to the node.
Proof To prove (a) we argue that procedure N is a depth-
first search. It exhaustively parses all nodes in A. The
while loop (line 12–39) pushes in the stack ‘nodes’ all A’s
nodes, pops them out one by one, and terminates only when
the stack is empty. Test conditions in lines 20, 23, and 26
checks all A’s artifacts, and build the attack surface.
Statement of line 26 tests for objects that are untrusted
because input objects. Line 29 checks artifacts for being
related with untrusted objects, maps them together, and add
those objects to the list of untrusted objects. Therefore N
correctly build set of entry points, the set of exit points, and
the function that maps points to their untrusted objects.
To prove (b), we argue about K. The correctness of K is
proved by induction on the structure of A’s artifacts. The
base case is obvious: K assigns to the final activity and flow
nodes the empty set (see Listing 1), which is correct since
no attack can be associated to those nodes. To prove that K
assigns to the artifacts in the attack surface just build all
and only the attacks that are applicable, we reason on case-
by-case bases. But, here, we give the argument only for
a?v !N: the other cases are similar and are omitted. K
associates a?v with attack k1; k8, and k11 (see Listing 1).
All these attacks can send a message that will be received
in a?v, thus they are applicable. Besides, no other attacks is
applicable to this node. This can be proven by exclusion:
we show only the case concerning k7. The template of k7 is
a sniffing by a receive message, but no message can be
received from the a?v artifact. So k7 is not applicable. To
exclude all the other attacks we use similar arguments. By
inductive hypothesis, KðNÞ contains all and only appli-
cable attacks and consequently Kða?v !NÞ ¼
fk1; k8; k11g [ KðNÞ contains all and only attacks which
SysML Activity
Diagrams
Source Code,
Specification
Application− Independent
Attacks−Library
Attack
Surfaces
Application−
Dependent
Attacks
Modelling
Detecting Instantiating
Using
Fig. 4 System attacks
generation framework
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are applicable to the artifact a?v !N. The argument
about the correctness and completeness of K and the other
artifacts is similar and we omit it.
Point (a) and (b) together prove the correctness and
completeness of Algorithm 1.
Proposition 2 Algorithm 1 runs in time linear on the
number of A’s nodes.
Proof We count the number of steps of N: the algorithm’s
time complexity is proportional to this number. N traverses
all A’s nodes exactly once, and this takes OðjNjÞ steps,
where N are A’s nodes. Each tests/checks in N can be
done in constant time. The built attack surface is at most as
large as jNj, and so K, whose takes constant time to as-
sociate handful attacks to each nodes, runs OðjNjÞ time
too.
6 Case study
We analyse a use case scenario in our framework. The
scenario describes a very common situation. It regards a
corporate organizations, such as a company or an univer-
sity, whose employers use the information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) intensively to collaborate with
outside, national or international, partners. They commu-
nicate prevalently per e-mails and share documents in
repositories (or in the cloud) which they access remotely
through a browser or by SVN clients.
In such a scenario there are obvious concerns about the
security of confidential data. What employers share in
repositories may be sensitive information, as it happens
when such corporations are collaborating in partnership
projects. The access to such data should be protected by
authentication protocol but often, despite not always, it all
depends on a secret password. There are many points
where an attack can intrude. The password can be weak,
and he can guess it, or it he can target the human user by
sending phishing mails [e.g., (Francesco et al. 2013)] in the
hope to victim replies by giving up the password directly or
that he/she clicks on a link which will cause the download
of a trojan or of a similar digital malwares that give control
to the intruder. However, a pattern of an attack can be
complex and not so easily discoverable as we will show.
What we describe below has been taken from a real
situation, one of the many that happens in the domain of
communication and data security for ICT-based corpora-
tions. We have removed any reference to real names, ids
and domain names but the core is exactly the same.
6.1 Description
A corporate organization works in a research project called
‘‘XSPARS’’. The project has a public web page, say http://
www.xspars-project.eu, and a repository, available at
https://www.xspars-project.eu/repositories/xspars. The
repository access is protected by login and password. This
is a common choice which, is weakened further, when is
the host of the repository that generate the login and
password for anyone, and distribute the pair by email.
During the execution of the project, the researchers that
participate to the project receives emails, usually from a
mailing list such as xspars-all@xspars-project.eu. A typical
mail form that mailing list looks like the following:
Such mails, useful in their giving directly the link to
access to the document, are very common. The text quoted
above is actually taken from a real mail, posted in the
mailing list of an existing project. The scenario also con-
siders that xspars’s researchers may read their mails using a
tablet or a smart phone. With that device they also access
Table 3 Simplification of
CAPEC ids
ki 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
CAPEC-id 148 151 116 117 125 131 148 152 225 28 163
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the repository, download, read, write (or simply comment)
and re-upload documents.
The system that is part of this scenario consists of users
and their devices (a tablet or a smartphone), which run an
email client and a browser. (Indeed only a browser is
sufficient if we assume that the researchers are accessing
their mail via a webmail server). The system also include
two servers, the repository and the mail server. Figure 5
shows the SysML representation of a part of this system,
that concerning the access to the repository. The part about
reading emails is similar.
6.2 Analysis
Using our framework, the library of attacks, and the al-
gorithm presented we have found the following attack
surfaces. Each represents a possible attacks on the model of
the system. One of such attack surface, ðn; x; o; chÞ, is the
following:
n ¼ fEmail?emailbody; LoadpageðurlÞg
x ¼ fAuthentication!ðurl; login  passwordÞg
o ¼ femail  body; urlg
ch ¼ fðEmail?emailbody; emailbodyÞ; ðLoadpageðurlÞ; urlÞ;
ðAuthentication!ðurl; login  passwordÞ; urlÞg:
Here, we have give a name for the objects, but they are not
represented in Fig. 5. Object emailbody is untrusted
because that object is the object of an input artifact, and
url is untrusted because it depends on it: the url is taken
from the body of the email. Figure 6 shows an instance of
the attack k11 (CAPEC-163), which is associated to n and
to x.
An analysis of the attack surface, reveals that such an
attack is actually possible. Here how it works. To prepare
this attack, the intruder starts by doing a web search (Fig. 3,
top). He finds the project’s web page, and there the
members of the project and their names. He collects the
emails and information concerning the research topics.
This second step of the attack is shown in the Fig. 3,
middle. Knowing the public web page, the intruder clones
it, creates a similar url, say https://www.xpsars-project.eu
Fig. 5 XSPARS SysML
activity diagram
Fig. 6 SysML activity diagram of the attack for XSPARS system
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and get a self-signed certificate for it. It also creates a
repository there.
Then, it sends an email to one of the researcher with a text
that mirrows the text of an usual mail with a link to the made-
up repository https://www.xpsars-project.eu/repositories/
XSPARS/Meetings/2014/Agenda.doc (Fig. 3, bottom).
The intruder counts to phish those researchers that may
not be warned by browser’s alerting them because of self-
signed certificate [such as mini Opera, which only change
the visual icon of the lock but does not warns explicitly the
users (Bella et al. 2013)]. The intruder aims at having the
researcher logging in into its repository. It can engineering
the document in such a way to appear corrupt or empty, but
from this action he can steal the researcher login-password.
Here, reasoning further from what the attack surface shows,
we imagine the intruder accessing the real repository and
later mirroring the entire original repository into its own
repository so to make it look like the real repository. In this
way he can re-iterate the attack and hope to phish more
researchers from the consortium.
Of course this analysis just made on the basis of the
given attack surface gives an argument that the attack is
feasible. It does not necessarily happen, or happen in this
way. As a final remark, we note that, in this argument, we
avoided to talk about probabilities. They may be not easily
estimable.
7 Conclusion
One way to reduce the cost of system and software prod-
ucts is to detect vulnerabilities to attacks, technically called
attack surfaces, at early stages of the development life-
cycle. We presented a framework to detect attack surfaces
and the attacks that can exploit the surfaces. We developed
a library of system attacks that includes for the first time
the social engineering aspects. In addition, we devised an
algorithm that detects attack surfaces of the system and a
function that assigns for each attach surface a set of po-
tentially harmful attacks. We proved the correctness and
the completeness of the whole procedure. We also validate
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the presented
framework by applying it on a real case which is a system
of a research group from our institution. The results show
the potentiality of presented approach.
The presented work can be extended in the following
directions. First, we intend to apply our framework on
different real cases. Also, we would like to achieve more
complete catalogue that covers more type of attacks such
that related to product chain and cyber-physical systems. In
addition, as a next task is to implement the proposed al-
gorithm and deliver a prototype.
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